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The Incarnation and the Trinity
making clear *re logical problems that are said to infect them; I'll then
proceed to oudine some responses that Christians can make to show
these difficulties can be avoided. It must be noted at the outset that the
burden of this chapter is not to provide arguments or reasons for thinking
that Jesus Christ is God, and still less to provide evidences for the resur-
rection. The task of this chapter is to make clear a particular kind of ob-
jection to the logical consistency of the Incarnation and the Trinity, and
to show how one might go about defending the coherence of these central
christological claims.
Section I:
The Doctrine of the Incarnation
What Does the Doctrine Claim?
Let's take the doctrine of the Incarnation first. Anyone who ever attended
Sunday school knows ttrat Christians claim thatJesus Christ is God's Son.
While this claim is fine as far as it goes, it can readily be seen to be inade-
quate as a complete statement of what we believe about the person of Je-
sus Christ. The problem with this initial formulation of the Incarnation is
that there is a sense in which all believers (indeed, many would say all per-
sons) are children of God, and so for the doctrine to be informative, more
must be said.
The Deity of Christ
!7e begin to get closer to the traditional understanding of the doctrine of
the Incarnation if we alter slightly the Sunday school formula to read je-
sus Christ is God the Son. This is an improvement for a couple of reasons.
First, it suggests Christ's uniqueness in a way that the first formulation
does not. Second, it says more about who Christ is in a way that explains
this uniqueness. For we believe not only that Christ was God's Son; we
believe that he was God. And in whatever sense the Christian is willing to
affrrm that you and I are "sons and daughters of God"'it is not the same
sense in which we affirm that Jesus is the "only begotten Son" of God.
As mentioned above, a part of what we mean when we call Jesus
"the Son of God" is thatJesus is God, ttrat he is divine. Yet we must tread
carefully here. For it turns out that the logic of the claims Jesus Christ is
239
THOMAS D. SENOR
God and Jesus Christ is God the Son are rather different, and different in a
way that matters, particularly in regards to the doctrine of the Trinit-v
which we will discuss later in the chapter. In order to understand the way
these claims diverge, one must see that the word "is" is functioning ra*rer
differently in them. Philosophers call the "is" in the sentence Jesus Christ
is God the Son tfle " 'is' of predication. " This means) essentially, that what
is referred to on the left side of the "is" has the property being referred to
on the right side of the "is." So The sky is blue, The dog is longhaired, and
Mary is kind xe all examples that include an "is" of predication. In each
case, the grammatical subject of the sentence refers to an object in the
world and the predicate picks out an attribute that the sentence then
claims the subject has.
In contrast to this is the "is" of identiqv. As it sounds, the role of this
"is" is to assert an identity, that is, to claim that there is a single person or
object that can be referred to in two ways. For example, in the sentences
Batman is Bruce Wayne and The Morning Star is Venus the "is" should be
understood as meaning "is the same thing as." The terms "Batrnan" and
"Bruce'Wayne" refer to one and the same object as do the terms "Morn-
ing Star" and "Venus."
With this distinction in hand, let's look again at the basic
christological formulae Jesus Christ is God and Jesus Christ is God the Son.
These two sentences can now be seen to be making very different, though
complementary, claims. In the former sentence, the word "is" should be
understood as an "is" of predication. To affirm thatJesus is God is to af-
firm his deit-v. He was not onl_v human, not only superhuman, but he was
and is God in the flesh.
On the other hand,Jesus Christ is the Son of God is an identity claim.
It asserts that Jesus of Nazareth, ttre son of Mary, is the same person as
God the Son, the eternal second person of the divine Trinity. Of course,
in identifying Jesus with a divine person, we are implicidy affirming his
deity. So there is a sense in which Jesus Christ is the Son of God expresses
everl'thing thatJesas Christ is God expresses and then some.
The Hurnanity of Christ
This understanding of Jesus Christ is the Son of God takes us about half
way to an understanding of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Yet traditional
Christianity makes a further claim about Jesus. Not only was he the same
person as God the Son, he is also a human being 
- 
"truly man" in the
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The Inrarnation and the Trinitv
language of the Chalcedonian Council of a.o. 451. Quoting from the
council's Definition of Faith:
ffie all unanimously teach that we should confess that our Lord Je-
sus Christ is one and the same Son; the same perfect in Godhead and
the same perfect in manhood, truly God and tuly man . . . like us in
all things except sin; begonen of the Father before all ages as regards
his Godhead and in the last days the same, for us and for our salva-
tior5 begonen of the Virgin Mary. . . .1
It is important to note here that "truly man" should be taken at face
value. The council wanted to adopt a statement that would confirm not
only God the Son's bodily existence (as against the heretical Platonic sect
known as the Gnostics) but also his complete humaniry (as against the
equally heretical Apollinarians who claimed ttrat while Christ was God in
the flesh, he was not fully human since he didn't have a human soul).
The doctrine of the Incarnation can be summed up as follows: Jesus
Christ, a human being, is identical to God the Son.
Section II:
The Incoherence Obiection to the Incarnation
As we've seen, the fundamental christological statement is an identity
claim: Jesus Christ is God the Son. As intended, this identity claim entails
that there is a person who is fully God and frrlly human.
It is no wonder or great secret that the doctrine of the Incarnation has
been considered a mystery or even a paradox. Yet there are those who insist
that "mystery" or "paradox" is too generous and ttrat the doctrine is down-
right contradictorl'. \Xtrile to many ears the difference between mystery,
paradox, and contradiction might seem negligible or "only semantic," to a
philosopher the difference is crucial. The difference is this: a paradox or
mystery can be thought of as a statement that seems on the face of it, either
to contradict itself or to defy a full or complete explanation. Flowever, a
contradiction is not merely something that defies complete explanation or
that seems contradictory. Rather, a contradiction is a statement that genu-
inely zi contradictory. And a contradiction' as any logician will tell you, is
by definition a proposition that can't possibly be true. For example, the
1. As quoted in Gerald Bray's Creeds, Councik, and Christ (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 1984), 162.
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proposition This triangle has exactly four inurior angles is contradictory be-
cause it makes two claims, each of which is inconsistent with the other: viz.'
it asserts This is a triangle arfl Th has exartly four inteior anglcs.
Now since "this" in both sentences refers to the same object, and
since a triangle is by defrnition an object with exactly three interior angles'
This has exactly four interior angks entatls that the same object has exacdy
*ree interior angles and exactly four interior angles. But nothing could
be like that. Necessaril-v, any object that has exactly four interior angles
does not have exactly three interior angles. So the original statement is
contradictory and cannot possibly be true.
Many critics claim that an exactly similar problem infects the doc-
trine of the Incarnation. Here's why, in the words of an imaginary
christological critic.
If Jesus is ..firlly God" then he must have any feature of God that dis-
tinguishes God from creatures. Traditional Christian theology claims,
for example, that one such feature is God's being the uncreated cre-
ator of the universe; being the uncreated creator of every*ring other
than the Godhead is thought to be one of the characteristics of divin-
ity. So, then, if Jesus is fulty God, he must be the unqeated creator'Bur
Christians also claim thatJesus did not just take on a human body, but
that he is "fi,rlly human." Thus, the doctrine of the Incarnation entails
that Jesus has all of the properties necessary for being completely hu-
man. Now Christians believe that humans are created entities, and it
is plausible to think that on the Christian view, being created is a fun-
damental characteristic of humanitY. So, rhen, if Jesus is fully human,
hc must be created. Now the contradiction is clear. For the Christian
claims that Jesus is both God and human, and given what is said
above, if he has these two natures, then he must be created and
uncreated, But that is a contradiction.
As bad as all of this is, things get even worse, since the same prob-
lem arises for many of the properties that the "God-man" must have'
Thke, for example, the pair of propertie s'. being omnipotent and possess-
ing only finite power.The former is required for divinity, the latter for
humanity and yet, clearly, no being could have them both. To extend
this list, one needs only to consult the table of contents from a text on
the traditional Christian conception of God (among those atributes
you will find omniscience, atemporality, aspatiatty, necessity, and so
forth). Any such property is, allegedly at least' necessary for divinity
but incompatible with properties necessary for being human (limited
knowledge, temporality, spatiality, and contingency)'
242
Initia
The charge c
thoughtful res
lieve, Christia:
there is no dor
cognitive powt
its completene
understand, a..
shall do now i
and see what I
Let's beg
glant that cor
uncreated Crea
that if the doc
we need, then,
some consiste
Christ zi fully {
A First Resl
Many Christia
sponse ttrat go
planation of tl
the imaginary
teatrnents of t
nate GodlJesus
man) but is a st
the Incarnate t
Christ has a cr
tures it is, the r
tic. So if we sa
preexistent we 7
serting is With
spect to his diat
\7ith this
leged contradi
contradictions
fects the doc-
an imaginary
rtradictory be-
the other: viz.,
nglns.
ne object, and
nterior angles,
:ct has exactly
nothing could
nterior angles
il statement is
'God *rat dis-
eology claims,
rncreated cre-
:ry'thing other
istics of divin-
ed creator. But
:nan body, but
rnation entails
ompletely hu-
:ntities, and it
:ated is a fun-
is fully human,
the Christian
what is said
: created and
re same prob-
n" must have.
xt and possess-
, the latter for
th. To extend
rom a text on
ose attributes
essity, and so
'y for diviniry
rman (limited
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Section IfI:Initial Responses to the Contradiction Charge
The charge of logicar inconsistency is a serious one thar cails for athoughtful response. \(rhen confronted with objections ro what we be_lieve, christians often retreat to slogans about .,divine mystery.,, \xrhile
there is no doubt that it is hubris of the first order to suppose that human
cognitive powers are sufficient to the task of knowing the ovine nature inits completeness, it is also irresponsible to fai_l ,o ,rr. ,h. gift of intellect to
understand, as best we are able, the God who is our *"k... So what we
shall do now is tackle straight-on the important objection detailed. above
and see what headway can be made.
Let's begin by granting our opponent a few of her points. we shallgrant that contradictions are necessarily false, that Jesus christ is the
uncreated creator and Jesus christ is neated are contradictory and hence
that if rhe doctrine of the Incarnation entails them, rhen it is false. \xzhat
we need, then, is an account of the Incarnation that anows us to say, with
some consistency and, one would hope, plausibility, that while Jesuschrist zi fi:ily God and fully human,he is notborh created and uncreated.
A First Response
Many Christians, when confronted with this chelenge, offer a line of re_
sponse that goes something as follows. They begin by noting that the ex_planation of the Incarnation with which we've been working, and which
the imaginary critic above accepts, is incomprete. In p"rti.Jar, orthodox
treatrnents of the Incarnation also include the following claim: The Incar_
nate GodlJesus christ has tz'o distinct, unmingled natures-(one diztine, one hu_
man) but is a singlz person. unlike us (or for that matter) God the Father)the Incarnate God has two natures. As a result, any time we affirm trrat
christ has a certain characteristic we must say exacfly which of the na_
tures it is, the divine one or the human one, which ..has,, the characteris_
tic. so if we say, for example, Jesus christ was thirsty or Jesus christ waspreexistent we fail to make ourselves clear. $[hat we realry mean to be as-
serting is with respect to his humanity, Jesus christ was thirsty or with re_
spect to his diainity, Jesus Christ was preexistent.
$Zith this in mind, the defender continues, we can see that rhe al-leged contradiction (or set of contradictions) described above are nor
contradictions at all. For Jesus christ is created and, Jesus christ is
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uncreated are each ambiguous. $rhat the traditionar christian really
means by them is with respect to his humanity, Jesus christ is created andlvith respect n his diainity, Jesus chist is uncreated. But now we no longerhave the simple conradiction. For these properties are attributed to Jesuswith respect to two different natures.
compare what the christian says about Jesus with a more ordinary
case. consider John, as we shan call him, who is six feet four inches tall
and is a professional basketball player.John is arso a member of the sierraclub' At six feet four, John is short when compared with his NBA col-leagues. But, of course, he rather stands above the crowd at meetings ofthe Sierra club. Thus we can say that rvith respect rc NBA prnyers,John is
shortwhiTe at the same time aftrrming with respect to s;rrri cirb members,
John is ral/ without any fear of contradiction. Norice that if the l.vith re_
spect to. . . clauses were removed, the sentences would be contradictory.
However' once clarified, the apparent contradiction vanishes. similarlg
the apparent contradiction seen tn Jesus christ is created and, Jesus christis uncreated disappears once the impact of the two-natures 
"Jp"., of thedoctrine of the Incamation is fully appreciated.
Why the First Response Is Inadequate
Despite its initial attractiveness, the success of this reply is at best dubious.!7hile the traditional understanding of the Incarnarion does distinguish thedivine and human natures of God Incarnate, it also insists on the unity of ttreperson, and what's more, on there being t ,ingr" perron who has a[ the attri-butes or characteristics of God incamate. r?hat ttris means is that even ifthere are properties *rat christ has with respect to his being human and
other properties are had with respect to his being divine, the pioperties nev-
ertheless belong to a singre person. For example, if in virnre of being a pro-fessor, Richard has an obligation to spend the weekend preparing for hisMonday afternoon seminar, and in virtue of being a fathei Richard has an
obligation to go on a Boy Scout camp-out with his son, it is nevertheless truetlrai Richard (and not just Richard with respect to being a professor) has an obri-gation to prepare for class and that Richard (and not just Rirhard with respectn being a father) has an obligation to go camping. The conflict here is realand can't be disregarded because they are had in virtue of different rolesRichard has. similarly, christ's being uncreated witrr respecr to his divinity
and created with respect to his humanity wourdn't appear to change the fact
that, on this view, he is both created and uncreated. so the problem-persists.
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The Incarnation and the Trinity
Bur what about the example ofJohn? He is a .,single object of predi_
cation" and yet the sentences with respect to NBA phyers,John is short and,
with respect to sie*a crub mernbers,John is talrboth say something true
about him, even though, purged of their rvith respect to . . . crauses, they
would be contradictory. So what is going on here?
The answer is that terms like "short,'and ..tall,, are reratiaeterms in
a way that "being created" and "being uncreated creator,, are not. .v7hen_
ever we assert that someone is tall, we (implicitly, at least) have in mind
some group with whom we are comparing that person. $rhen a term is
relative, that term can apply to a person with respect to a particular group
and the term's opposite can apply with respect to another group. But
there are other attributes that are not relative and which, if hal by a per-
son, entail that the person does not have the "opposite,, property. For ex-
ample, if John is six feet four inches teil, he can,t arso be not six feet four
inches tall since being of a certain height is not a relative property. Again,
whether a swimming poor that is seventy-two degrees Fahrenheit is warm
or cold is relative; but its being seuenty-two degrees Fahrenheitis not. In the
same way, the properties of being created and of being uncreated are not
relative properties. And so the same maneuver that shows that seemingly
contradictory sentences which ascribe relative properties to a person are
noncontradictory cannot be used to defend the Incarnation against theincoherence charge. So it seems that this solution fails.
A Second Response
s7har, tJren, can the belever say to the objector? w'en, the first *ring to do
when faced w"ith an apparent contradiction is to take a close look at the
relevant propositions to make sure that fhey are genuinely contradictory.
But t'is is precisely what we just tried, and despite our efforts, the conrra-diction remains. \(rhere does ttris leave us? well, it means that we can,t af-firm both je sus christ is neated, and. Jesus christ is uncreatedsince they arein contradiction. Is this a cause for alarm?
That depends. lfe have big christological problems if we are forced
to say that the doctrine of the Incarnation implicitly harbors a contradic_
tion; since contradictions can't be true, we will then be forced to say that
this key christian claim is false. And we have seen a line of reasoning tothe effect that the doctrine of the Incarnation entails 
.both that Jesuschrist was created and that he was uncreated. so what we must do is re_
consider that line of reasoning.
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The trouble, of course, is that the line of reasoning looks to be co-
gent. The argument is that if Jesus Christ is fully God and fi.rlly human,
then he must have all of the properties required for divinity and for hu-
maniry. But no one can be God who isn't the creatorl and no one can be
human who isn't created. Therefore, if Jesus Christ is fully God and firlly
human, then he must be created and uncreated. But that's a contradic-
tion, and since anlthing that leads by sound reasoning to a contradiction
is false, the doctrine of the Incarnation is false.
Two crucial claims of the above argument are: Being diztine entaik
being uncreated and Being human entails being reated.If either of these pre-
mises can be shown to be false or even dubious, then the particular obiec-
tion we are now considering will have been defused. And if this strategy
can be applied elsewhere (e.g., with respect to parallel claims about om-
nipotence[imited power), we might have the means to resolve the general
logical problems thought to infect the doctrine of the Incarnation. More
on this shortly.
Section IV:
The Incarnation Defended
Now it is clear enough, I think, that traditional Christian theology com-
mits the Christian to accepting that being uncreated is part of the essence
of God. It is impossible that any being should be both God and yet cre-
ated. For if he is created by another, then he is dependent on the creative
activity of that being, and the existence of God can never depend on what
another agent does. So I think we must agree with the objector that Jesus
Christ is uncreated is a claim the Christian must accept.
\(rhat about the other half of the troublesome pair? Must a Christian
affirm *rat jesas Christ is created? I think the best argument for Jesus
Christ is created is this: Being created or caused to exist by another is part of
the very meaning of the terrn human being.'Whrle it is not easy to offer a
complete and satisfactory definition of human being, we know that it will
include being created, being limited in knowledge and power, being in time and
space,etc. So the proposition A human being is createdis what philosophers
call "analytic" (meaning that the meaning of the predicate concept is con-
tained in the meaning of the subject concept).
On the face of it, this is a strong argument. It certainly must be con-
ceded that if a part of the meaning of being human is being created, then it
is impossible for Jesus to be human and be uncreated. So if we are to re-
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sist tlris argument for Christ's being created, we must deny that being cre-
atedis part of the meaning of being human. And, looking down the road a
bit, we'll also have to deny that being limited in krnzalcdge and power, for
example, are part of its meaning.
But can the Christian accepr this (seemingly radical) claim that a
human being can be uncreated, unlimited in power, etc.? TWo consider-
ations might make us think not. First, she might think that christian the-
ology requires her to accept these definitional assertions (that is, for ex-
ample, that being created is part of the concept of being human). Second,
she might not think that there are theological constraints but that there
are broader constraints of rationality. She might think that it is irrational
for anyone, Christian or not, to deny that being created is part of the mean-
ing of being human, iust as it would be irrational to think that possesse s three
inteior anghs is not part of the meaning of being triangular.
I know of no good reason for thinking that traditional Christian the-
ology commits one to anything at all regarding the meaning of humanity.
As we've noted, the Christian will think that humanity was brought about
and sustained by the creative power of God, and she'll undoubtedly have
many other beliefs about humanity (e.g., that humans are made in the im-
age of God, saved through the death and resurrection of christ and that
humans should treat one another as they'd like to be treated), but these
won't be beliefs about the.content of the concept.
An ltnportant Distinction
At this point it will be usefirl to note another philosopher's distinction.
Some concepts are called cluster concepts. A cluster concept is one that has
as its content other concepts and only other concepts. For example, the
concept bachelor includes the concept being male, being aduh, and being un-
maried. To use the language of a few paragraphs ago, the propositions lll
bachelors are male, All bachelnrs are aduhs, and AII bachelors are unmarried
are all analytic. Cluster concepts, then, are exhausted by the content of
the concepts they contain. Any analytic proposition will be the unpacking
of a part of the cluster of the concept.
Not all concepts are cluster concepts. Consider, for example, the
concept tiger. A tiger can't be defined, for example, as a four-legged feline
with black stripes and a tail indigenous to tropical climes. For a tiger miss-
ing a leg is no less a tiger. And zoologists might well discover a species of
tiger that is native to deserts or that has no tail. Even if it were to nun out
247
THOMAS D. SENOR
that all varieties of tigers ever discovered have tails, it u'ouldn't follow that
nothing without a tail could be a tiger. In short, tigers are zoological kinds
and questions about what tigers could be like w-hile still being tigers are
best left not to the iingUist or philosopher but to the zoologist or biologist.
The concept of a tiger is a natural kind concept.
Above, I argued that there was nothing in traditional doctrine *rat
would require the Christian to say that the concept of humanity includes
the concept of being created. But now we can see that not only is ttrere
nothing in Christian doctrine that requires this, but that a careful look at
the concept humanity makes it clear that it includes nothing of the sort.
The reason is that hurnanity is best construed not as a cluster con-
cept, like bachelor,but as a natural kind concept,l)ke tiger. \Thether or not
humanity just is a natural kind will be a matter of controvers-v. Argrrabl-v,
part of rvhat it is for something to be a natural kind is for it to be the kind
of thing whose nature can be understood by the natulal sciences- Now if
humans are purely biological creatules, then we are natural kinds. How-
ever, if mind,lbody dualism is true and we have immaterial souls, then
there will be an important part of human nature that w-ill be outside the
domain of the empiricdl natural sciences.
Regardless of how this particular issue turns out' once we see that to
be human is to be a member of a kind that is intrinsic to the created order
and not merely a product of the way our language and concepts have de-
veloped (as would seem to be the case rvith cluster concepts lske bachelor
and triangle),'"r'e can see that the essence of human nature is not to be de-
termined by philosophers sitting in armchairs and analyzing the mean-
ings of words or concepts. Rather, our theory of human nature (ow philo-
sophical anthropology,as it is sometimes called) will have to be informed by
our best science and our basic worldview with which we are working.
Applying the Distinction to the Incoherence Objection
With this in mind, we can then ask why the Christian should affirm that
Jesus Christ is created. The doctrine of the Ingarnation asserts that God
the Son was preexistent and took on human nature. Jesus Christ, the hu-
man being, is God the Son. That means that Jesus Christ wasn't created.
Notice that this is consistent with saying that both Christ's particular hu-
man body and the human nature he assumed were created. So there are
truths in the near neighborhood but they don't logically imply that Christ
was created. And once we see that one can't simply infer Xai createdfrom
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x is human in the same way one can infer X is tilinear from X is a tian-
gle, there is no longer an obvious reason for accepting this that jeszs
Christ is created.
Similar moves can be made for most of the other logical problems
involving the Incarnation. For example, being omnipotent, or maximally
powerful, is required for divinity; and it is often thought that being limited
in power is necessary for being human. But, again, the primary reason for
insisting on this is the mistaken assumprion that by dcfinition a human is
limited in power. Once we've seen that this isn't true, the primary reason
for beiieving that *ris limitation property is required for being human is
undercut.
This general reply to the incoherence charge is made even more
plausible by noting a useful distinction between common and essentialhu-
man properties. A conlmen human property is a property that all or al-
most all humans havel an essentialhuman property is a property that any-
thing must have to be human. Consider the example of being born on
Earth. Every human being, we may presume, who has ever existed has
had this property. Yet it certainly isn't required for being human: even if it
never happens, it is surely possible rhat someday a human baby will be
born on a space station or on the moon. If this is even possibre, then we
know that having a terrestrial birth is not essential for being human. The
christian can plausibly maintain that the limitation properties that are of-
ten thought to be essential to human nature are rather only common. And
it is an easy mistake to think that because a given property or characteris-
tic is had by every human then it is essential for being human. But such is
not the case.
The underlying idea is that while the Christian, as a Christian, is
committed to the truth of certain claims about God and about what is es-
sential for diviniry she is under no such pressure) as a christian or as
even just as a rational, educated person) to make general claims about
what is essential or required for being human.
Tu:o Pitfolls to Be Aooided
a. Pitfall One: "In Every Way Like LIs . . ."
This strategy does well in getring around the logical difficulties the doc-
trine of the Incarnation is said to have. However, the christian must tread
carefully here. For even if the reply we've been articulating allows her to
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affirm an orthodox christology without the *reat of logical inconsistency,
she must be carefirl to avoid two further pidalls: first, she might have
cause to worry that the model of the Incarnation we now have is one that
stresses the diviniry at the expense of the humanity of Christ. The con-
cept of humanitv is the one that rve found to have suitable flexibility, and
so the properties that are in logical tension with the properties of divinity
were compromised. The potential problem, then, is that while the mallea-
bility that we found in the concept of humanfiy might allow us to affirm
the divinity and humanity of Christ, we might end up with an account of
the Incamation in which the Incarnate God's ability to share our condi-
tion, to "know it from the inside" as it were, is seriously imperiled. For
example, if Jesus had the omniscient mind of God, we might wonder in
what sense his humanity was anything like ours. After all' whatever ex-
actly the divine mental life is like, it's a safe bet that it is strikingly differ-
ent than ours. Besides, we must be careful not to fall into the heresy of
Apollinarius, viz., that Jesus was the divine soul in a human body. To be
firlly human requires having not iust a human body but a human mind as
well. So we must affirm both that Christ was omniscient and that he had
the mind of a human.
b. Pitfall Two: "I Know Not the Day or the Hour . . ."
The second pitfall to be avoided is that of incompatibiiity with the Gospel
accounts of the life of Christ. The Gospels themselves portray Christ as
claiming that he doesn't know the date of the Second Coming, that it is
known only to the Father.2 Yet omniscience, by definition, requires know-
ing everything there is to know. So it would seem that the strategy dis-
cussed above won't work where God the Son's knowledge is concerned.
Tbto Strategies for Aooiding the Pitfalls
a. Kenoticism
There are two options open to the Christian to meet these concerns. The
first of these is actually a more general strategy for dealing with the inco-
herence charge. There is a theological tradition known as kenoticism that
takes its name from the Greek word kenoszs, which means "self-
2. Matthew 24:36.
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emptying." The scriptural staning point for this view can be found at
Philippians 2:5-17 where Christ is said to have given up his divine posi-
tion in order to take on our nature. A kenotic theology would handle the
tricky matters we are now considering by maintaining that the preexistent
second Person of the Trinity, God the Son, gave up his position and cer-
tain features of divine existence in order to take on humanity. Among
those things he emptied himself of was his omniscience. And any other
characteristic that would have prevented him from living fi-rlly human life
would have also been surrendered, at least for the duration of his earthly
mission.
Although the kenotic strategy is attractive, it is also problematic.
The chief difficulty is this: if God the Son giztes up or empties himself of
many of the divine attributes, how can we continue to hold that he is fully
God? On the contrar.v, it appears that in giving up or emptying himself of
these divine qualities he giaes up his diviniry. Remember that christological
orthodoxy requires not only that we say that Jesus Christ is identical to
the preexistent God the Son, but that he is fully God as well as fully man.
The chief concern for the kenoticist is to demonstrate the consistency of
her view with the claim that during his earthly ministry,Jesus was fully di-
vine. Still, there is something initially attractive and plausible about the
kenotic position and one must not underestimate its potential to answer
objections such as this.3
b. The Two-Minds View
The second way of avoiding the aforementioned pair of pitfalls is to at-
tribute to the Incarnate God two minds, one human and one divine. The
divine mind is omniscient, while the human mind contains limited knowl-
edge of the sort corunon to first-century Jews (and it might also have
contained false beliefs that would have been typical of humans living in
that place and time). Similarly, one might eschew talk of two distinct
minds and attempt to model Christ's knowledge after his power. Presum-
ably, the Incarnate Christ possessed the omnipotence of God but, in most
instances, refrained from exercising more power than would have been
exercised by an average human. In the s€une way, it can be suggested that
3. In his essay "Reconsidering Kenodc Christology" (tn Tiinity,Incarnation and
Atonzment, ed. Ronald J. Feensua and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. [Noue Dame: Notre
Dame University Press, 19891, 128-52), Ronald J. Feenstra considers obiections such
as this and tries to show ttrat kenoticism has the resources to answer them.
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his taking on humanity, including a human mind, required the masking of
his divine knowledge. Just as contemporary psychology suggests that
much of what goes on in the human mind goes on below the conscious
surface, one might suppose that taking on humanity required Christ's
consciousness to be similar to ours but that below the conscious surface
there existed the omniscient mind of God. Of course, this wouldn't mean
that Jesus was limited to only the contents of his human mind. For God
the Father could have chosen to allow the earthly mind to have more or
less access to the contents of the divine mind, as might be necessary for
completion of his ministry on earth.a
I am aware of how presumptuous all of this can sound. Who are
you, one might as\ to pretend to know these sorts of facts about the In-
carnation? My defense is this: I am not maintaining thatl know that these
claims about the cognitive features of the Incarnation are true) nor even
that I am justified in believing them. But why then, one might wonder, are
we doing this? Here it is helpful to remind ourselves about what it is we
are doing here. An objector has argued that the Incarnation is incoherent.
Above, I have sketched out some of the responses that have been de-
fended by Christian philosophers recently. Some of these accounts seem
to be open to theological objections. In response to these I have set out a
model which shows us how we might conceive of the Incarnation. I don't
claim to know that this model is true. I do claim, however, that (i) it is
consistent with our general strategy for dealing with the logical problems
the doctrine of the Incarnation allegedly possesses, (ii) it is consistent
with the full humanity of Christ and the biblical record, and (iii) we have
no good reason to think it is false. I am making no claims to have demon-
strably prwen anything; I maintain only that the reply I've given to the
logical incoherence objection is sufficient to blunt the charge as stated.
The ball is back in the objector's court.
Section V:
The Doctrine of the Triniw
It is not possible to have a deep or even adequate understanding of the In-
carnation without having some conception of the docrrine of the Trinity.
4. Thomas V. Morris has defended the "nvo minds" view of the Incarnation in
chapter six of his book, The Logic of God Incarnau (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986).
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The Incarnation and the Trinitv
We've seen that the former doctrine asserts that Jesus Christ is identical
to God the Son. But who is *tat? Although this hasn't yet been men-
tioned, there is a terrific difference between the claims Jesus Christ is God
the Son and Jesus Christ is God. S7e will see later why the latter is prob-
lematic. For now, though, simply note that the former makes a rather
more specific kind of claim, a claim about God the Son.
Oversimplifying a bit, we can say for starters that the doctrine of the
Trinity is the claim rhat God is three persons and yet one. An initial diffi-
culty with this formulation is that it invites the reading that God is one
and yet itree of the same thing. But that is not the genuine content of the
doctrine. Rather, the naditional understanding is that God is three persons
and one substance. Christians maintain that they are monotheists (rather
than tri-theists) because they assert a single divine substance. The three
persons of the Trinity are God the Father, God the Son, and God the
Holy Spirit.
Ire wiil have to say more about the content of this doctrine as we
discuss the puzzles it generates, but for a second pass we can characterize
its content as'. The Godhead is three persons (God the Father, God the Son,
and God the HoIy Spirit) and yet a single substance.
It might go without saying that this has been an exceedingly quick
and cursory description of a complex and much-debated doctrine. But
since this chapter is primarily about the logical issues generated by these
doctrines, it has been necessary to keep the discussion brief. 'We move
now to a consideration of the logical difficulties raised by the doctrine of
the Trinity.
Section VI:
The Incoherence Obiection to the Trinity
In many ways, the logical oddity of the doctrine of the Trinity is more
readily apparent. Superficially, it looks like the Christian makes the fol-
lowing set of claims about God: The Father is God, Thc Son is God, The
HoIy Spirit is God. This, by itself, doesn't cause problems. For suppose
rhat a certain person) Susan' is (a) the oldest daughter of Millie, (b) the
mofher of Calvin, and (c) *re wife of Tim. !7e can then assert the follow-
ing tlrree things: The oldest daughter of Millie is Susan, The mother of Calain
is Susan, and The wife of Tim is Susan'
Since it looks like we might apply a similar strategy in the case of the
Trinity, one might wonder what the problem is. It will begin to become
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clear if you think for a minute about what follows from these three claims
about Susan (we will call these the "Susan triad"). If the three statements
composing the Susan triad are true, then the oldest daughter of Millie is
the wife of Tim and the mother of Calvin is the oldest daughter of Millie.
(Math enthusiasts can note that the "transitivity of identity" is what al-
lows us to draw these inferences.) The problem with the trinitarian triad
is that they represent only a part of what the Christian says about the
Godhead. In addition, she insists that the Father and Son are not idcntical
the Son and the Spirit are not idcntical, and that the Father and the Spirit
are not idcntical. It appears to be just as if one were to grant that Susan is
the mother of Calvin and that Susan is the wife of Tim but then deny that
the mother of Calvin is identical to (i.e., is the same person as) the wife of
Tim. Inasmuch as that would be contradictory, the critic assefts, so is it
contadictory to make the trinitarian claims above but deny the identity of
the Father, Son, and Spirit.
Section VII:
Responding to the Trinitarian Critic
The logical issues surrounding the Incarnation and those surrounding the
Trinity are different enough that the response we've offered to the critic
of the Incarnation will not work here.
As we have seen, the problem is that the Christian makes a set of
claims which apparently imply that the Father, Son, and Spirit are identi-
cal. However, the orthodox understanding of the Trinity denies the iden-
tity of the persons while insisting that the three are yet "one God." So the
trick is to find a way of explaining the doctrine that keeps the three per-
sons distinct while maintaining the unity of the Godhead.
The Heretical Extremes: Modalisrn and Trithei.sn
A good way to begin this discussion is to get a clear view of just what a
fine line it is ttre Christian theologian must follow if she wants to walk the
straight and narrow of trinitarian orthodoxy. This can be seen by consid-
ering a couple kinds of explanation of the Tiinity thar were labeled as her-
esies by early Church councils. First, consider modalism. The modalist ex-
plained the Trinity by stressing the underlying unity or oneness of God.
The Father, Son, and Spirit, the modalist claims, correspond to different
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modes or manifestations of the divine. The lncarnate God the Son, on
this view, is the same being and person as God the Father. The difference
is only in the way that he has manifested himself. This view was con-
demned as heresy because, while it clearly avoided the charge of polythe-
ism, it failed to do justice to the plurality of persons.
The ditch on the other side of the narrow path of orthodoxy is
yitheism. A view that stresses the diversity of persons at the expense of
the unity of the Godhead will be in danger of polytheism'
Recall that in our initial discussion of docnines of the Incarnation and
Trinity, we made a distinction between the "is" of identity and the "is" of
predication. If we now think back to the initial trinitarian triad (i.e., Thc Fa-
ther is God, The Son is God, The Holy Spirit is God) , we can see *tat we have
been treating these claims as identity statements. And from this it seems to
follow ttrat the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are all the same person (some-
thing the doctrine of the Trinity forces us to deny). Notice, however, that
*ris troubling consequence follows from the statements Thp Son is God and
Tlw Holy Spirit is Godthat The Son is the Holy Spirit ottly if the "is" in these
sentences is read as signi$ing identity. $7e can easily see *rat the same bad
consequence does not follow if these are "predication" Statements, in just
the way we can see that John is human and Grahnm is human don't together
entail that John and Graham are the same person.
So the first point of clarifrcation that the Christian apologist will make
is to note that the relevant sentences (i.e., The Father is God' Tfu Son is God,
and Thc Holy Spirit is GoA do not, as one might have first thought, include
the "is" of identity but merely the "is" of predication. Another way of stat-
ing our trinitarian triad is The Father is divine, The Son is diaine, Thp Holy
Spiit is dfuine. This adjustrnent resolves the logical difficulties for it no
more follows from, say, The Son is God artd The Father is Godthat The Fa-
ther is thp Soz than it follows from the earlier example thatJohn is Graham.
It would be premature, however, to think that this resolves the prob-
lem satisfactorily. Here's the reason: for all we've said so far, the Father'
Son, and Spirit are no more one than are any three human beings in vir-
tue of ttreir corunon humanity. That is to say, if we leave things as we've
stated them, we may seem to have fallen prey to the heresy of tritheism
since the only sense in which the three are one is that they are each divine,
and that is a very thin sense of oneness.
'!(i'e can now get a sense of the trickiness of this doctrine. For it
seems that to the extent that the distinctness of divine persons is stressed,
one falls into tritheism. On the other hand, emphasis on the unity of the
Godhead threatens to bring with it the heresy of modalism.
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Before saying more about how the Trinity might be understood in a
way that avoids at least the deepest parts of both ditches, let,s make a
rather simple, straightforward logical point. Indeed, this rough-and-ready
response has been hinted at before, but it is time to make it fully explicit.
one sometimes hears the objection to the Trinity that we've been
considering in a far more basic form, to wit:
christians say that God is three and yet one. But nothing can be both
three things and exactly one thing 
- 
that is logically incoherent. So
the doctrine of the Trinity is logically incoherent.
To this objection, there is a quick and easy sorution. when the creeds say
that God is three and yet one, they should not be understood as asserting
that God is three and one of the same thing.That would be contradictory
and obviously so. Rather, what is being claimed is that there is an impor-
tant unity in the Godhead as well as plurality.
Suppose you go into a store to buy some soft drinks for your family.
uThen you return, the kids say, "How many did you get?,'you respond,
"Six cokes; one six-pack." There is a perfectly clear sense in which what
you bought was "six and yet one." Even so, it is clear that if we said that
you had bought exactly six and exactly one of the same thing, we'd be
saying something foolish and contradictory. what you bought was one
six-pack and six cans of soda.
Fortunately for the sake of orthodoxy, the traditional understanding
of the Trinity recognizes the point we are making. As we've seen earlier,
the docuine asserts that there are three persons and one substance,not that
there are three Gods and exactly one God. So it is not open to the simple
and common objection of blatant inconsistency.
still, it cannot be doubted that, as traditionally undersrood, the
creed asserts both a trinity of persons and a fundamental unity, one that
makes the charge of tritheism a misunderstanding. so we need some kind
of account of divine oneness that allows for a pluralitv of persons but
which provides an underlying unity.
A Thinitarian Modet: plurality in Unity
Here is a way of understanding the Trinity which seems to capture what
is essential to the claim of the unity of the Godhead while permiming
three distinct persons to dwell therein. It should be kept in mind that I am
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not offering the following as a model I am convinced is tr1e. I believe,
with almost everyone else who has ever thought about the mattel' that the
doctrine of the Trinity is deeply mysterious. And that seems fully appro-
priate, since this docUine concerns the metaphysics of the nature of God
and it would be hubris of the highest degree for us to suppose our minds
were capable of understanding the divine essence. The point in our offer-
ing this model is to indicate that good sense can be made of the notion of
GOd aS "three in one." W'hile I have no wish to attempt to demonstrate
anything about the nature of the Godhead, I do want to defend tl:re coher-
ence of the doctrine and one way of doing that is by offering a model ac-
cording to which it can be understood.
Plurality
Let's begin with the plurality. There are three persons in the Trinity: Fa-
ther, Son, and Holy Spirit. As three persons, we presrune that there are
tltree centers of will and cognition. Each has a distinct function within the
Godhead. Being divine, none of the three persons is created; all are eter-
nal. Also, because of his divinity, each person has all the attributes neces-
sary for deity.
But in what sense are the three one? It is not enough that they are
one in the same way that three humans are one in virtue of their all being
human. !flere this all the divine oneness comes to, the charge of tritheism
would be legitimate.
In Unity
Many Chr.istians are unaware of the fact that part of the traditional doc-
trine of the Trinity includes the claim that there are centrd relations
among the members of the Trinity.s Some of the traditional ways that
have been suggested for seeing the divine Trinity as one are the following.
The relationship between the Father and the Son is said to be one of eter-
nal generation. Eternal because there is no temporal priority; the Father
5. A helpful introducrory discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity (and many
otler docrines of interest) can be found in Alister E. McGrath's Christian Theol-
ogy: An Introduction,2nd ed. (cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing co.' 1991)'
chapter 8.
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did not exist before the Son. Each is coeternal. Generation is also a rerrn
carefrrlly chosen. Historically, the use of this term was to insist that the
Son is the same kind of being (i.e., divine) as the Father, as against those
who claimed that the Son or "Logos" (the term of choice for some early
theologians) was created, which would have implied ttrat he was of a dif-
ferent kind than the Father.
The Holy spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the son, once
again to insist that the Spirit,like the Father and the son, is eternal and
divine.6
rfhat is important to note here is that while there are three coeternal
divine Persons, tiese Persons are said to bear fundamental menphysical
ties to each other, much closer ties than those held between member of
the same species. For example, the idea of the eternal generation of the
Son from the Father suggests an atemporal process, or at least an eternal
process underlying the being of the Son at every moment. The procession
of the spirit from the Father and son together has the same implications.
So one fundamental difference is apparently this: rhe Farher, Son,
and Spirit are ontologically united. The existence of any of these persons
is logically sufficient for the existence of all three. put another way, the
unity of the Trinity is grounded in necessary relations between the three
persons. This means that it is simply not possible for one of the three to
exist independently from the other two. such strong relations between
members of the Trinity are certainly not found between any created be-
ings. For even though, at least on certain plausible views, the existence of
Mary requires the prior existence of Mary's parents (that is, it is essential
to Mary that she be born of her parents rather than any two other peo-
ple), she is nevertheless quite capable of continuing to exist after their
deaths.
So one way in which the relation of the persons of the Trinity is
tighter than the relation of humans to each other is that the existence of
any one divine person is impossible without the existence of the other
two. still, one might think that this amounts only to claiming that the
three are in some way mutually dependent, but not that they are in any
significant way one.
Yet more can be said regarding their unity. And to see this, let's con-
sider an objection to something I've said so far. Trad.itional christian the-
ology claims that each of the persons of the Trinity is divine, i.e., each has
6- This is so according to the traditional creeds of lpestern christendom. Ac-
cording to the Eastem church, the Spirit proceeds from the Father only.
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The Incarnation and the Trinity
the properties necessary for being God. But that means that each is om-
nipotent. Yet, how, it might be asked, could there exist more than one
ornrdpotent being? For to be omnipotent requires, among other tfiings'
being at least as powerfirl as anlthing else that exists. Suppose, then' that
there are two omnipotent beings, A and B, and that A plans to see to it
that a certain event, X, comes to pass and B plans to see to it that X not
come to pass. Now, either X will come to pass or it won't. If it does, then
B, who anempted to prevent X, is not omnipotent. on the other hand, if
X doesn,t come to pass, then A, who attempted to make sure that X came
about, is not omnipotent. So perhaps talk about more than one omnipo-
tent person is logically inconsistent.
N eces s ariljt H arnt onious Wills
This difficulty depends upon the "coming apart" of the wills of the rwo
allegedly omnipotent beings. Suppose, however, that these two beings
have necessarily harmonious wills. To have wills like this requires not only
*rat these beings never in fact have a conflict of will, but that they never
could haae a conflict of wilk.This isn't to say that their wills are always nec-
essarily the same. To have harmonious wills requires oniy that there are
fundamental areas of agreement of will and no areas of disagreement. So
imagine a couple, Steve and Jenny. They both will to have a child. Sup-
pose that Jenny doesn't care much about the style of their chjld's hair or
clothes. But she does care about the layout and organization of the nurs-
ery and that the baby be breast-fed for the first four months of her life.
Steve, on the other hand, doesnlt have any real views on breast-feeding or
tle nursery but is quite panicular about the child's wardrobe and hair
(when she gets some, that is). Now, the situation I've described is one in
which two people have harmonious wills. For there is overlap (they both
wanted to have a child) and there are no areas of disagreement.
Still, Steve's andJenny's wills are harmonious, but not necessarily so.
They can and will have their con{licts. But the suggestion regarding the
Trinity is that their wills are necessarily aligned so that there is no chance
of disagreement. This isn't to say' though, that their wills are identical,
only that there is fundamental agreement and a lack of conJlict' Now if
this were necessarily so, if it is impossible that disagreement arise, then
the argument against more than one omnipotent being that we considered
above, is inelevant, depending as it does on conllict of will'
So the christian can offer a model of the Trinity according to which
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there are three persons, each having a will, power, and firll-range of cog-
nitive faculties, but which also emphasizes necessary relations between
them, of being and of will, in which their unity consists. This model, or
ones like it, have been labeled by some "social trinitarianism" as it seems
to emphasize the triune nature rather than the unity of the Trinity. It
should be noted, however, that the christian who accepts a moder similar
to that sketched above should not be taken as insisting that that is c// the
unity of the three persons consists in. Rather, she should be understood
as claiming that it is at lcast that. The sort of unity that the social trinitar-
ian model suggests is surely significant, but the three may be related in
ways that we've yet to conceive.
Section VIII:
Conclusion
I have not been tr)'lng to take away the sense of mystery that accompanies
these important christian doctrines. I believe these doctrines to express
truths of such a high order that our minds will certainly never caprure
them this side of eternity and may never clearly see them even when we
are no longer looking through a glass darkly. !7hat I have attempted to
dispel is not mystery but only the charge of logical inconsistency. so I end
with the reminder that my only claim for the models of the Incarnation
and the Tiinity that I have been sketching here is that they are not logi-
cally contradictory and they are in general agreement with the historical
understandings of these fundamental doctrines of the church.
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